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Regulated Deregulation: The New York Experience
in Electric Utility Deregulation
Harry First*

I. INTRODUCTION

The conventional wisdom has long been that the regulation of electric
utilities is a failed enterprise. Starting with a classic study that argued
that electric utility regulation had no effect on rates I through the most
recent critique by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2 one
would be hard-pressed to find strong defenders of the traditional
regulatory system (except, perhaps, for the state regulatory commissions
themselves). Bringing competition to this industry, as we have brought
competition to so many others in the past two decades, seems like
obvious policy.
Facts, however, have a way of forcing theory to confront reality.
Take, for example, June 26, 2000. On that day a price spike occurred in
parts of New York State's day-ahead electric power market. For five
consecutive hours (from 1:00 through 6:00 in the afternoon),
3
Consolidated Edison paid more than $1,000 per MWH for electricity.

* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I thank Darren Bush for his
comments on an earlier draft and Matthew Gabin for his research assistance in preparing this
article. (© 2001 Harry First.
1. George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of
Electricity, 5 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1962).
2. See Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Order No. 888, 75 F.E.R.C. $ 61,080, 1996 FERC
LEXIS 777, at *17-*38 (1996). But cf Paul L. Joskow, Deregulation and Regulatory Reform in
the U.S. Electric Power Sector, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT'S NEXT?
119-20 (Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000) (noting that despite hypothesized
deficiencies in cost-plus regulation, electric power sector performed "fairly well" over time, with
falling prices from 1900 to the 1970s; prices rose from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s, but
declined again during the 1990s).
3. Motion to Intervene, Answer and Comments of Consolidated Edison Company of New
York, Inc. and Orange & Rockland Utilities, Inc., Before the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, Docket Nos. EROO-3591-000 and EROO-3591-001 (New York Independent System
Operator), at 12 n.4 (Sept. 27, 2000), available at http://www.coned.com/Publiclssues/FERCEROO-359/000.pdf.
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That price spike resulted in a 30% increase in the average wholesale
price of electricity for the month4 and is estimated to have increased the
5
cost of electricity by more than $100 million.
It is difficult to be cavalier about $100 million. Indeed, this price
increase alone (and it is not the only one) should lead us to ask whether
prices under deregulation might actually be higher than they were under
regulation. If so, this might cast doubt on the validity of the economic
theory underlying deregulation in this industry. It might even be that
"free markets" are not the best policy prescription for this industry.
Before we can reach any conclusion on these ultimate questions,
however, it is important to understand how we have done electricity
deregulation so far. Experience may teach that we have failed in design,
rather than concept; this may lead us to structure a more realistic design
that can avoid the deficiencies of the traditional regulatory approach,
6
even if it cannot completely embrace the purity of free markets.
This paper will describe only a piece of the deregulatory experience
so far-the efforts of New York State to deregulate its electric power
markets. This description will show, I believe, that New York has not
really deregulated electricity markets. What New York has done,
instead, is to replace one regulatory system with another. The result is
what I call "regulated deregulation." The new system is more sensitive
to economic incentives than was the old, an important aspect of free
markets, of course; but the new system is also very much under
governmental control. In retrospect, to have thought that we would
have done otherwise seems rather naive.
II. THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE

A. The Initial Steps
The New York Public Service Commission (PSC) has a long history
of thoughtful efforts to use economic principles, and competition where
possible, to improve regulatory results. Often led by distinguished

4. Committee on Energy, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Restructuring New York's
Electric Power Industry: A Progress Report, 56 THE RECORD 56, 68 (2001) [hereinafter 2001
City Bar Report].
5. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Order Accepting Tariff Filing as Modified, 95 F.E.R.C.
61,471, 62,689, 2001 FERC LEXIS 1532, at *9 (2001) (estimate by New York Independent
System Operator).
6. See Darren Bush, Lessons from California: 10 Mistakes to Avoid in Deregulating an
Energy Market (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing substantive
mistakes in implementing deregulation).
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economists (Alfred Kahn and Eli Noam, 7for example), it has frequently
been at the forefront of regulatory reform.
The Commission's efforts to deregulate the electric power industry
were undertaken over a number of years, in a way that combined quasilegislative fact-finding, bargaining among interest groups, and
adjudicatory decision-making. The efforts began in 1993 when the
Commission initiated an inquiry into what it called "flexible pricing" in
the electric and gas industries in New York. The inquiry recognized
that some industrial and commercial customers in both industries were
in a position to have competitive options in negotiating contracts with
suppliers; the Commission accordingly adopted guidelines for the use of
such contracts. In 1994 the PSC began Phase II of this proceeding,
focusing on the electric power industry. The overall objective was "to
identify regulatory and rate-making practices that will assist in the
transition to a more competitive electric industry designed to increase
efficiency in the provision of electricity while maintaining safety,
environmental purity, affordability, and service quality goals."8 The
parties were "urged to work collaboratively to identify a few
comprehensive principles to guide the transition" to a more competitive
industry structure. 9 As a result of meetings held in September and
October of 1994, an agreement was reached on a set of proposed
principles covering eight areas, from competitive market issues to
economic development. 10 In June 1995, following further comment
from more interested parties, the PSC issued nine principles "to guide
the transition to competition.""
7. See, e.g., Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Investigate Performance-Based
Incentive Regulatory Plans for New York Telephone Company-Track 2, Opinion No. 95-13,
1995 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 440 (N.Y. PSC 1995) (adopting plan that "substantially deregulates"
telephone company earnings and adopting incentive-based regulation); Re Rate Design for
Electric Corporations, Opinion No. 76-15, 15 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 434 (N.Y. PSC 1976)
(adopting marginal cost pricing for electricity rate structures).
8. Re Competitive Opportunities Available to Customers of Electric and Gas Service, 154
Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th 35 (N.Y. PSC 1994) (Order Instituting Phase II of Proceeding).
9. Id. The Public Service Commission eventually grouped the parties that participated in
shaping deregulation into the following "interest groups": industrial and large commercial
consumers, residential and small commercial consumers, investor-owned utilities, labor unions,
publicly-owned utilities, competitors (independent power producers and energy service
companies), environmentalists, Department of Public Service staff, and other public agencies.
See Re Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, Opinion No. 96-12, 168 Pub. Util.
Rep. (PUR) 4th 515, 525 (N.Y. PSC 1996) [hereinafter Opinion 96-12]. The full list is set out in
Appendix D to the Commission's Opinion.
10. Re Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 162 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 4th
1, 1995 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 290, at *4 (N.Y. PSC 1995).
11. Id. at *1. The principles are set out in Appendix C to the Commissioner's Opinion. See
id. at *21 -*23.
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The first principle was that competition in the electric power industry
"will further the economic and environmental well-being of New York
State" and that "[t]he basic objective of moving to a more competitive
12
structure is to satisfy consumers' interests at minimum resource cost."
Further, "[p]rices should therefore accurately reflect resource costs, and
consumers should have a reasonable opportunity to realize savings and
other benefits from competition."' 13 The Commission also felt that
"[w]ith more competition should come less regulation," although
regulation was not completely eschewed ("[m]echanisms should exist to
identify and correct anti-competitive behavior.") 14
Critical to
restructuring was the PSC's seventh principle. The current vertically
integrated industry structure "must be thoroughly examined" to insure
15
that it does not impede "effective wholesale or retail competition."'
The Commission urged the parties to continue to work
collaboratively, an approach that the Commission believed had "great
potential to lead to innovative public policy solutions."' 16 Regular
meetings were held (open to the public) between March and November
1995; even after a recommended decision was issued in December 1995
(by an administrative law judge and a PSC Deputy-Director),
educational fora were held at ten locations around the state to give
citizens an opportunity to present their views to the PSC staff.' 7
The result of this effort was the Commission's Opinion 96-12, a more
elaborated decision setting out the Commission's vision for the electric
utility industry in New York. In this Opinion the Commission again
addressed the "threshold question" of whether to "move toward
competition in the first place."' 8 Answering its question, the
Commission reiterated the traditional economic benefits of competition:
"First, competition should result in lower bills as competitors have a
greater incentive to lower costs than do utilities under a regulatory
regime. This has generally been the experience of the electric industry
abroad and other deregulated industries."' 19
Not only did the
Commission expect that a competitive system would produce "lower
electric prices in New York State overall than currently,"20 it also
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at *7.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id. at*12.
Id. at*15.
Opinion 96-12, supra note 9, at 521-23 (detailing the procedural history).
Id. at 530.
Id.
Id. at 529.
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believed that competition would narrow the2 1"large difference between
New York's prices and the national average."
A second benefit of a competitive system would be an increase in
consumer choice. "Customers of all sizes have expressed a preference
for allowing customer choice. This is particularly true for commercial
and industrial customers, who maintain that the business climate in New
York would likely improve if retail access were available for them at
some definite time in the future." 22 The Commission's expectation was
that a variety of choices in the market would enable customers ' to
"arrange their consumption to maximize their welfare and save costs. 23
24
Again, competition will lead to lower prices.
Although the Commission recognized the benefits of competition, it
also recognized that competitive markets might not be possible in all
circumstances. Specifically, the Commission recognized that there
were more than thirty "load pockets" around the state in which
transmission constraints limit the number of producers that are able to
provide electric power to a particular area.2 5 Because sellers could
exercise market power within these pockets, some "mitigation
measures" (not specified in the Opinion) would need to be adopted to
26
counterbalance its exercise.
The Commission indicated that it would begin by implementing
wholesale competition, to be followed shortly thereafter by competition
at the retail level.
Deregulation would include a "reasonable
opportunity" for recovery of strandable costs from customers, following
alleviation of as much of the costs as possible by the utilities
themselves, but the Commission gave no guarantee that every dollar of
strandable investment would be recovered from ratepayers.2"
The
Commission also recognized the need to address environmental
concerns potentially ignored in a competitive marketplace and to
maintain consumer protections that regulation provides. 28 Finally, the

21. Id.
22. Id. at 534.
23. Id.
24. See id. ("Finally, retail competition is most likely to stimulate a competitive ESCO market
and encourage ESCOs to find ways to deliver power and services at lower prices.").
25. Id. at 543. The primary load pockets were in New York City and Long Island. Id. at 531.
A load pocket is a load area "that, because of transmission system limitations, requires that some
generation be located within the area for reliable service." Id. at 520 n. 11. These producers
accordingly do not face competition from more distant suppliers.
26. Id. at 554.
27. Id. at 555.
28. See id.
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Commission stated that although it "strongly encourage[d] divestiture"
2 9 It left
of generation assets, it would not require immediate divestiture.
30
company."
each
the issue to be "worked out individually for
Opinion 96-12 directed the five major New York utilities to file
individual plans for implementing the Commission's vision, including a
plan for retail access, rate reductions, and corporate restructuring. 3' The
utilities subsequently petitioned for court review of the order, broadly
attacking the Commission's power to engage in long-range planning
with regard to the future structure of the industry, as well as arguing that
32
the specifics of the Commission's directions exceeded its powers.
The court, however, wrote approvingly of the Commission's broad
jurisdiction:
The overriding issue of this case is the mode to be followed by the
People for generation, transmission and distribution of ...electric

energy-monopolistic or competitive, or some gradation in
between.... The Public Service Law is a blueprint within which the
Public Service Commission is charged with the governance of the
energy resources33 of the State of New York within the guidelines
therein set forth!
Indeed, even though the PSC had not yet ordered the industry to do
anything other than file plans, the court indicated that it was quite
prepared to uphold the Commission's efforts to restructure the
industry.

34

29. Id. at 542.
30. Id.
31. Seeid.at555.
32. See Energy Ass'n of N.Y. State v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 653 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
Specifically, the utilities attacked the PSC's power to order retail wheeling, to restructure the
industry by ordering divestiture of generating facilities, and to refuse to require ratepayers to
compensate the utilities for all stranded investments. Id. at 510, 512-13.
33. Id. at 507.
34. See, e.g., id. at 513:
Opinion 96-12 encourages utilities to divest themselves of generation assets in order
to facilitate the development of a competitive market place ....It does not, however,
in fact direct divestiture. Nevertheless petitioners petition the Court for a declaration
that the Commission lacks authority to do so. Though academic questions are not a
proper subject for judicial review [citation omitted], it is meaningful to note that
divestiture may be effected through exercise of powers inherent in the PSC's discretion
to set rates.
Prometheus' act of courage and beneficence in breaking the monopoly of the gods
by giving electrical energy to mankind-and its terrible consequences to him-may
not be demeaned by a mere transfer of that monopoly to the lords of industry, for the
benefit only of some and not of all. It was a gift to mankind, not a gift to a favored
few. If events ultimately demonstrate that utility ownership of generation facilities
jeopardizes "just and reasonable" rates or "safe and adequate" services [citation
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Each utility subsequently negotiated consent settlements with the
Commission. 35 Although each settlement varied to some extent, they
did have some common features. Most called for scheduled reductions
in electricity prices to all classes of customers, which reductions would
occur whether the user purchased electricity from the regulated firm or
from some alternative supplier. Con Edison's agreement, for example,
provided for a 25% reduction for five years to certain large industrial
customers; residential customers were to get a graduated reduction
which would reach 10% in the fifth year (ending in 2002).36 All except
for Rochester Gas & Electric agreed to divest their non-nuclear
generating facilities (RG&E agreed to set up a structurally separate
affiliate to hold its generating unit). All agreed that within a three or
five-year period all customers will be able to purchase electricity from
an alternative supplier. As a City Bar Association Report subsequently
stated, "[a]ll of the plans are premised on the expectation that a
competitive market for the supply of electricity will result in lower
37
electricity prices for all classes of customers."
B. Wholesale Markets
With the split of ownership of generation from transmission and
distribution came the need to establish a new intermediary institution
which would not only take over the function of managing the dispatch
of power through the transmission grid, but could also deal with the
pricing of that power. In its 1996 Opinion, the PSC called for the
establishment of "an independent system operator" to operate and
coordinate the electric grid and to perform a "market exchange
function" by acting "as the bidding or market forum for spot market
transactions." 38 The Commission recognized that the ISO would be
subject to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(the ISO would be involved with sales for resale, which is committed to
FERC jurisdiction). 39 Nevertheless, the PSC retained regulatory
oversight, stating that it expected the utilities to work collaboratively

omitted[, it would appear the Commission may condition discretionary rate relief on
asset divestiture.
Id.
35. See Committee on Energy, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, A Status Report:
Electric Utility Restructuring in New York, 53 THE RECORD 347, 363 (1998) thereinafter 1998
City Bar Report].
36. Id. at 366.
37. Id. at 365.
38. Opinion 96-12, supra note 9, at 544.
39. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(2) (2000).
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with the PSC staff and to present their filings to the Commission before
submitting them to the FERC.4 °
The PSC anticipated that the ISO would provide initial filings with it
and the FERC by October 1, 1996, and that a wholesale competitive
market "will begin in early 1997. ' ' 41 These predictions proved overly
optimistic.
The logical institution to take over the ISO functions was the New
York Power Pool (NYPP), formed in 1966 to improve system reliability
42
after a 1965 blackout disrupted service throughout the Northeast.
Numerous interested parties subsequently met to develop detailed
proposals for transforming the NYPP into the New York ISO, leading to
a proposal eventually presented to the FERC in January 1997. 4' The
Proposal as revised included the following elements: 44 1) energy prices
would be set through continuous day-ahead and real-time auction
markets; 2) the price of energy would vary depending on location (using
location-based marginal cost pricing), thereby reflecting the varying
costs of energy production throughout New York State; 45 3) auctions
would follow a "single price" approach, in which the highest single bid
price sufficient to clear the market would set the price for all accepted
bids; 4) transmission customers would pay a congestion charge for use
of the transmission system, to the extent that a particular energy
transaction involved a congested transmission path; and 5) customers
would be allowed to buy and sell energy through bilateral contractual
transactions independent of the NYISO's auction markets.
After extensive review, the FERC approved the ISO proposal in
September 1999.46 The NYISO began operations in November 1999;
on December 1, 1999, the NYISO took full control of New York's
wholesale power system, nearly three years behind the PSC's proposed
47
schedule.
40. Opinion 96-12, supra note 9, at 533.
41. Id. at 548.
42. DEP'T OF PUB. SERV., STATE OF NEW YORK, INTERIM PRICING REPORT ON NEW YORK
STATE'S INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR 18 (2000) [hereinafter INTERIM PRICING REPORT],
availableat http://www.dps.state.ny.us/nyiso.pdf.
43. 2001 City Bar Report, supra note 4, at 59.60.
44. See id. at 60.
45. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 86 F.E.R.C. 61,062, 61,222-61,224, 1999 FERC
LEXIS 176, at *78-*93 (1999) (discussing location-based marginal cost pricing).
46. FERC conditionally authorized the establishment of the ISO in 1998. Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. et al., 83 F.E.R.C. 61,352, 62,404, 1998 FERC LEXIS 1284, at *1 (1998). It
approved the ISO's governance structure in September 1999. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. et
al., 88 F.E.R.C. T 61,229, 61,760, 1999 FERC LEXIS 1880,at * 14 (1999).
47. 2001 City Bar Report, supra note 4, at 61 & n.18.
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In the understated words of a December 2000 report on the NYISO
48
done by the PSC staff, "[t]he NYISO has had a difficult beginning."
The technical effort necessary to run the two auction markets, plus the
effort to monitor the results, has proved more challenging than expected
and much effort during these first two years has been spent dealing with
market design issues and mechanisms to control price spikes.
One feature of particular note has been the willingness of the NYISO
to impose a number of bidding rules under which it will not accept the
"highest bid price" in its auctions, in effect imposing regulated prices in
place of market-set ones. For example, on June 5, 2000, the NYISO's
Management Committee approved a proposal to adopt a "temporary"
bidding cap of $1,000 per MWH; after the June 26 price spike, the
NYISO Board raised the proposed cap to $1,300 per MWH (the highest
bid received during the June 26 price spike). 49 The NYISO explained
that although it was "philosophically opposed to any form of price
control, 5 ° there was a need for the caps in the absence of "price
responsive demand ' 5 1 (that is, consumers continued to demand
electricity in peak periods when supply is tight, particularly in the
summer, leading to potential price spikes). The cap was originally set
to expire on October 28, 2000.52 It was subsequently extended to
October 31, 2001, because of the continuing possibility of tight supplies
during the Summer 2001 period, and then for an indefinite period
pending the establishment of a new northeastern regional transmission
54
organization.
More important are the "market mitigation measures" adopted by the
NYISO to "mitigate the market effects of any conduct that would
substantially distort competitive outcomes" in New York electric
markets. 55 These measures are designed to remedy conduct that (1) is

48. INTERIM PRICING REPORT, supra note 42, at 2.
49. N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 92 F.E.R.C. T 61,073, 61,296 n.3, 2000 FERC LEXIS
1469, at *3 (2000).
50. Id. at 61,296.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 61,303.
53. See N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 95 F.E.R.C. 61,186, 61,658, 2001 FERC LEXIS
1021, at*1 (2001).
54. See Order Granting Extension of Energy Bid Cap and Temporary Extraordinary
Procedures Subject to Modifications, 97 F.E.R.C. 61,095, 2001 FERC LEXIS 2570, at *1
(2001) (extending cap until the Northeastern Regional Transmission Organization is "operational
and operating pursuant to market rules as established in the final rule issued in the Commission's
RTO market design and market structure rulemaking").
55. See NYISO Market Monitoring Plan, Market Mitigation Measures, Attachment H to
FERC Electric Tariff, § l.a (2001), availableat http://www.nyiso.org/services/oatt.html. The
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"significantly inconsistent with competitive conduct;" and (2) would
result in a "material change" in one or more prices in a New York
56
electricity market.
What conduct is considered "inconsistent with competitive conduct"?
According to the NYISO, it is conduct that "would not be in the
economic interest of the Market Party in the absence of market
power." 57 Such conduct can take the form of: (1) "[p]hysical
withholding" of output; (2) "[e]conomic withholding" of output
(unjustifiably high bids); or (3) "[u]neconomic production" of output (to
take advantage of a transmission constraint).5 8
The rules then identify the criteria for determining whether any of
these three types of conduct have occurred and hence whether market
power has been exercised. For example, "economic withholding" is
defined to occur where a bid is 300% higher than the "reference levels"
for the generator in question (or $100 per MWH higher, whichever is
less). 59 "Reference levels" are defined in relation to past bids, or, if
adequate data are not available, in relation to the estimated costs of the
facility or an average of competitive bids of similar facilities. 6° When
economic withholding occurs, and prices increase by 200% (or $100 per
MWH, whichever is less), the NYISO can intervene immediately to
impose a "default bid" equal to the reference level. 6 1
C. Retail Competition
Opinion 96-12 also sought to foster competition at retail,
emphasizing the need to establish access to retail electricity markets.
The PSC envisioned the formation of the ISO as a "first step" which
would then lead to "an orderly and rapid transition to full retail

tariff filing was accepted by FERC on June 28, 2001. See N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., Order
Accepting Tariff Filing as Modified, 95 F.E.R.C. 61,471, 2001 FERC LEXIS 1532 (2001).
56. See NYISO Market Monitoring Plan, Market Mitigation Measures, Attachment H to
FERC Electric Tariff, § L.a (2001), available at http://www.nyiso.org/services/oatt.html.
57. Id. § 2.2.b.
58. Id. § 2.3.
59. Id. § 3.1.2.
60. See id. § 3.1.4.
61. See id. §§ 3.2.1, 4.2. Bids that increase prices by 100% are subject to a "slower"
mitigation process, under which the NYISO can file a petition with the FERC for review of
mitigation measures. See id. § 3.2.3. The NYISO also administers mitigation measures for bids
in New York City, where a transmission constraint can prevent access to competitive generation.
If the combined bids for the day-ahead in-City market have a market clearing price that is 5%
greater than the price at Indian Point, then either the average bid prices during an unconstrained
period or cost-based bids are substituted. See 2001 City Bar Report, supra note 4, at 89.
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access." 62 The model of retail access, the PSC wrote, was to provide an
opportunity "for each individual retail customer to buy electricity from
a generator (either directly or through a power marketer/broker) rather
and distribution
than through a regulated utility. The transmission
63
end-users."
to
power
deliver
simply
would
utility
Retail competition and choice, however, have proven difficult to
implement. In a proceeding begun in March 2000, the PSC attempted
to assess the progress that had been made in opening retail electricity
markets in New York to competition and to identify obstacles to
achieving retail competition. 64 A report issued a year later by the
administrative law judges hearing the matter revealed that fundamental
issues about retail competition still needed to be resolved (for example,
whether utilities should be permitted to remain in both the commodity
and retail businesses) and identified a variety of obstacles to the
establishment of a viably competitive retail market.
A number of the identified obstacles center around wholesale
markets. 65 Wholesale price volatility makes it difficult for energy
supply companies ("ESCOs") to guarantee particular prices to
customers. Delays in payment settlements between the ESCOs and the
NYISO compound the problem, making it difficult for an ESCO to
66
know what risk it was taking in guaranteeing particular retail rates.
Transmission constraints limit the opportunity to move power to areas
of highest need and limit the numbers of competitors in certain areas.
Most customers lack demand metering and are unable to reduce load in
response to price signals.
The key problem, however, may simply be that the potential savings
to consumers from choosing alternative suppliers have been "too low to
generate customer interest." 67 Where savings are a small percentage of
a relatively small bill, and where uncertainty about alternative suppliers

62. See Opinion 96-12, supra note 9, at 523.
63. Id. at 533.
64. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission Regarding Provider of Last Resort
Responsibilities, the Role of Utilities in Competitive Energy Markets, and Fostering the
Development of Retail Competitive Opportunities, Case No. 00-M-0504, 2000 N.Y. PUC LEXIS
261, at *10-*11 (2000).
65.

See CONCEPTS, ISSUES, AND VIEWS OF THE FUTURE: REPORT ON THE PARTIES'

COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS, at V-8 -V-9 (April 3, 2001), available at http://www.dps.state.ny.us/
00m0504/ 00m0504_final.PDF [hereinafter APRIL 3 REPORT].
66. "As of mid-August, [2000] the [NY]ISO had issued only one balancing bill to ESCOs,
covering their customers' actual usage for November 1999." See id. at V-9.
67. See id. at V-2.
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is high, retail switching is not economically attractive. 68 Although a
number of these problems have greater impact on residential, or smalluse consumers, industrial consumers have not fared much better and the
69
retail market for these consumers is similarly "virtually nonexistent."
The result is an overall customer migration rate to ESCOs for New
York State of 3.9% as of March 2001.70
The question of the future role of the utilities in retail markets was
addressed in a Recommendation Decision issued in July 2001 in which
the administrative law judges incorporated a proposed "end-state
vision" for New York retail electricity markets which would further
disaggregate the various components of the sale and distribution of
electricity. First, electric utilities should exit the "commodity" market,
that is, they should no longer be permitted to buy or sell electricity.
Second, they should be "removed from any other market that becomes
71
workably competitive."
The decision did not recommend immediate implementation of this
vision. It qualified the proposal with five preconditions, the most
significant being the existence of "workably competitive wholesale
markets." 72 The timetable was left open-ended. The administrative law
judges concluded that "it does not appear that workably competitive
wholesale markets for electricity will exist for three to four years, and
workably competitive retail markets for residential and small
commercial customers may not develop for a number of years

68. The April 3 Report notes that large customers may find the savings adequate to justify
switching to a competitive ESCO because the absolute amount of the savings is larger (even
though it is only a small percentage of the overall charges). See id. at V-2 n.4.
69. Id. at V-85 ("The current state of the retail market for electricity among industrial
consumers is similar to that for residential customers-that is, virtually nonexistent. [R]equests
by industrial customers for bids on their electricity requirements often are met with little or no
response.").
70. See Proceeding on Motion of the Commission Regarding Provider of Last Resort
Responsibilities, the Role of Utilities in Competitive Energy Markets and Fostering Development
of Retail Competitive Opportunities, Case No. 00-M-0504, 2001 N.Y. PUC LEXIS 446, at *30
(2001) [hereinafter Recommendation Decision].
71. Id.at*228.
72. See id. at * 119. The other conditions are: ESCOs be able and willing to provide the
services in the relevant industrial, commercial, or residential electric market; all customers who
need service can obtain it; there is "general public acceptance of restructuring and a reasonable
expectation that the utility's exit from the market will yield additional benefits or savings for
consumers"; and the legal issues as to the Commission's authority to order these changes have
been addressed. Id.
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thereafter."7 3 Accordingly, it was not "prudent" to set a "date certain"
74
for requiring the utilities to exit all energy commodity markets.
D. Effect on Prices
Table 1 indicates that average prices for electricity in New York have
not declined since deregulation began in 1996 and that prices remain
high in relation to other major industrial states.
Table 1. 75 Comparison of Average Electricity Prices: New York,
Major Industrial States, and U.S., 1996-2000 (cents per KWH)
(average revenue)
200076
1999
1998
1997
1996
New York
California
Illinois
Michigan
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Texas
U.S. Average

11.06
9.48
7.69
7.10
6.30
7.96
6.16
6.86

11.13
9.54
7.71
7.04
6.25
7.99
6.17
6.85

11.13
9.03
7.46
7.09
6.38
7.86
6.07
6.74

10.71
9.34
6.95
7.14
6.40
7.67
6.04
6.66

11.19
8.53
6.58
7.11
6.51
6.59
6.46
6.69

Indeed, as Table 2 shows, New York's electricity rates are the third
highest in the United States (second in the continental United States).
Table 2. 77 Average U.S. Electricity Prices, 5 Highest States, 200078
(cents per KWH) (average revenue)
State
Price
1. Hawaii
14.04
2. New Hampshire
11.60
3. New York
11.19
4. Vermont
10.22
5. Rhode Island
10.20

Id. at *113.
Id.
U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Estimated data for 2000.
U.S. Energy Information Administration.
Estimated data for 2000.
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Given the slowness with which deregulation has been implemented in
wholesale markets, and the fact that the data for 2000 are estimates, it
may be that the effects of deregulation have yet to be seen. It seems
unlikely, however, that the result will be a price decline. There is
general agreement that wholesale prices in 2000, the first year of the
NYISO's operation, were higher than historical levels.7 9 This increase
was in part caused by higher natural gas and oil prices incurred by New
York generators (particularly important in Eastern New York) and in
part caused by the outage of the Indian Point 2 nuclear unit (which
provides substantial capacity in Eastern New York). 8° On the other
hand, the summer of 2000 was cooler than prior years, which should
have reduced prices. 8 1 Based on the assumption that new generation
and transmission investment will lag behind demand growth and that
bidders will be able to exercise market power and engage in strategic
bidding behavior, future prices are predicted to rise, with summer rates
in 2005 predicted to be 46% higher than 2000.82
III. REGULATED DEREGULATION
Three points emerge from the description of New York's experience
with electricity deregulation. First, there is still a great deal of
regulation, both at the state and federal levels. We may not have a cost
of service rate regulation (although such rate regulation had already
been greatly diminished both by PSC initiatives and by a tendency to
negotiate rate reductions rather than order them). But we do have
extensive governmental oversight of the mechanism put into place to
manage competitive markets, and the NYISO itself is exercising rate
regulatory power. Second, the time line has been substantially longer
than was predicted. The New York Public Service Commission thought
that wholesale markets would be operating by 1997 with retail
competition to follow shortly. Neither is safely here. Third, the main
goal of deregulation, the lowering of price, has not been achieved. For

79. See David B. Patton, NEW YORK MARKET ADVISOR ANNUAL REPORT ON THE NEW
YORK ELECTRIC MARKETS FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2000, at 11 (April 2001) [hereinafter ADVISOR

REPORT], available at http://www.nyiso.org/services/documents/groups/mgmt-comm/04 17_01/
annual-report-patton.pdf; APRIL 3 REPORT, supra note 65, at V-8 (noting that wholesale prices
"have been volatile and higher than historical levels"); 2001 City Bar Report, supra note 4, at 39
(stating that "[e]nergy prices in New York are higher now than prior to the formation of the
NYISO").
80.

See ADVISOR REPORT, supra note 79, at 11-19.

81. See id. at 20-21.
82. See id. at 22-24 & fig. 15.
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a number of reasons, prices in New York have remained, at best, at
historical levels and are still high in relation to other states.
Four factors help explain these results: the institutions of
deregulation; the approach that regulators have taken to "market
power"; the industrial facts of electricity markets; and the design of the
wholesale auction market.
A. Institutions of Deregulation
Deregulation in the United States has most often been led by the
regulatory agencies themselves. This is a paradox for public choice
theorists, who would not have predicted that "captured" regulatory
agencies would push into the marketplace the very companies they
supposedly had been protecting.8 3 It has also been the case, however,
that the legislature has subsequently stepped in to shape the industry.
Sometimes this happens quickly (as with trucking 84 ); sometimes it takes
the legislature far longer (as with telecommunications 85).
Electricity deregulation is likewise regulatory agency-led, but there
has yet to be real legislative direction. The FERC has proceeded under
the haziest of mandates from the 1992 Energy Policy Act. 86 The New
York Public Service Commission, however, has not had even that
amount of legislative oversight, but 87has developed and directed
electricity deregulation solely on its own.
One consequence of this legislative default is that the PSC's normal
consultative processes (as opposed to its adjudicative processes) have
been even more overtly legislative than would otherwise have been the
case. The result has been that the PSC has cast its role both as policymaker and as crafter of compromises among various competing interest
groups. This inevitably muddies its role as administrative decisionmaker acting pursuant to delegated legislative authority. If its call for
collaborative efforts among interest groups more resembles legislative
efforts than administrative efforts, it must always be aware that its
activities are ultimately subject to court review. Although that review
has been quite favorable to the Commission so far, nevertheless, the
83. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1393-94 (1998).
84. See Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. § 13101 (2000).
85. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
86. See FERC Order No. 888, supra note 2, at *141 (discussing 1992 Act).
87. All other states that have engaged in electric power deregulation have done so with
legislative action. See FED. TRADE COMM'M STAFF, COMPETITION AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTRIC POWER REGULATORY REFORM: FOCUS ON RETAIL
COMPETITION app. A (Sept. 2001) (reviewing deregulation in twelve states).
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Commission may feel itself better served by getting the parties to agree
rather than having to get them into court. This need for legislative
compromise inevitably slows the process.
Even had there been legislative input, the fact is that the Public
Service Commission is the only government institution with the tools to
manage the deregulation of this industry. But having the PSC guide
deregulation has consequences. No matter how committed the PSC is
to marketplace incentives, it still approaches the problems, first of all,
from its institutional perspective as the agency that has been (and will
continue to be) responsible for regulating the electric power industry.
Ultimately this entails protecting consumers from excessive rates while
still making certain that the industry is financially viable so that it can
provide an essential product. Cost of service rate regulation has always
sought to do both, and the Commission continues to refer to the need to
balance consumer and producer interests. Reliance on markets, by
contrast, rests on the assumption that everything will work out, that
consumers will be well served, that the efficient will prosper, and that
supply will meet demand. Regulators do not make these assumptions.
Regulators are responsible for results and will be blamed for failure.
Deregulation has also been affected by the decision to make the New
York Power Pool into the Independent Systems Operator. The NYPP
spent thirty years serving a technical function of dispatching power
produced by vertically integrated regulated utilities. The NYISO began
with the same building and much of the same staff at the NYPP; its
software, rules, and procedures were, to a large extent, adaptations of
what the NYPP had been using. 88 Not surprisingly, the NYPP was not
fully ready to take on the additional task of setting up complicated
wholesale electric markets so that they would work effectively and not
be subject to potential gaming by sophisticated bidders.
B. Price Regulation and Market Power
The regulatory perspective of the PSC and the NYISO are most
clearly shown in the way they think about "market power" in
comparison with how "market power" is dealt with in antitrust analysis.
For antitrust purposes, market power has been defined as "the power to
control prices or exclude competition" 89 or "the ability profitably to
maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant period of

88.
89.

See INTERIM PRICING REPORT, supra note 42, at 19.
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
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time." 90 What is critical for antitrust, however, is not the extent to
which price is above competitive levels, but the power to impose the
price rise and make it stick. For example, it is not an antitrust violation
for a seller (or group of sellers) to set a price "above the competitive
level"; indeed, even a monopolist can sell at the monopoly price without
incurring liability. 9 1 What is of concern to antitrust are the conditions
that enable this pricing to occur.
Antitrust focuses on market structure, rather than actual prices, not
because antitrust is indifferent to prices that exceed costs. Antitrust
looks to minimize government intrusion into economic decisions, an
approach that is consistent with market principles. If markets are
competitive, or potentially so, there is little reason to ask courts to stop
supra-competitive pricing that the market itself will correct. In fact,
antitrust assumes that the courts are not institutionally able to police
high prices on an on-going basis. As Donald Turner has noted, "to hold
unlawful the charging of a monopoly price by a monopolist, or the
maintaining of noncompetitive prices by oligopolists, would be to
92
invoke a purely public-utility interpretation of the Sherman Act."
Congress did not intend the courts to act "much like public-utility
commissions in order
to cure the ill effects of non-competitive
93
oligopoly pricing."
The New York Public Service Commission, of course, is a public
utility regulatory agency. Thus, it should not be surprising that when
the PSC talks about the exercise of market power it refers not only to
structural conditions that might enable a seller to exercise market
power, 94 but also to the ability of sellers with "dominant market power"
to price above marginal costs and earn excessive profits, a result from
which it intends to protect consumers. 95 Even more directly, the efforts
of the PSC staff to identify market power have not focused on market
structure but on the application of behavioral tools which can identify
whether market power has been exercised by examining the extent to
which bids from individual generating units deviate from marginal

90. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 0.1 (1992),
reprinted in JOHN J. FLYNN, HARRY FIRST & DARREN BUSH, ANTITRUST: STATUTES, TREATIES,
REGULATIONS, GUIDELINES, POLICIES 260 (2001).
91. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 294 (2d Cir. 1979).
92. See Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelismand Refusal to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 669 (1962).
93. Id.
94. See Opinion 96-12, supra note 9, at 541-44.
95. See id. at 542 n.98.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

cost. 96

Similarly, the market mitigation rules developed by the NYISO
are based on comparing current bids to past bidding behavior or to
costs. "Market power" is exercised, by definition, when bids are too far
97
above these reference price thresholds.
Not only are the PSC and the NYISO willing to call bids that exceed
marginal costs an "exercise of market power," they think it is important
to do something about such prices. Thus the NYISO, in seeking
approval from the FERC for bidding caps and faster mitigation
procedures, argues that it is indefensible to tolerate price spikes such as
the June 26 spike that resulted in "substantial and unjustifiable wealth
98
transfers from buyers to sellers."
Nor should it be surprising that the PSC's administrative law judges
would be concerned that electricity markets might very well produce
high prices.
[T]he lack of meaningful elasticities on both the demand and supply
side, coupled with increasing shortages of supply, is a recipe for
disaster. As demand equals supply on-peak, the price of electricity in
the wholesale markets, if not otherwise capped, could rise without
limit. Furthermore, these market characteristics could allow suppliers
with even a very small share of the overall market to exercise
significant market power,
to raise prices to uneconomic levels and to
99
extract excessive profits.
C. The IndustrialFacts of Electricity Markets
The peculiar characteristics of producing electricity are wellknown. 1°
Electricity generally cannot be stored.
It must be
manufactured by a generating plant at virtually the same time that it is
consumed (the ultimate in just-in-time manufacturing, observes Paul
Joskowl0 ). Electric power networks are not switched networks;
electricity does not flow directly from the producer to a specific
consumer, but follows the laws of physics. Electricity goes into a
common pool of electric power, drawn on by consumers of that
electricity. The network must be constantly balanced, in terms of
96. See INTERIM PRICING REPORT, supra note 42, at 37-39 (use of the Lerner Index).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
98. See FERC Order, supra note 5, at 62,689.
99. Recommendation Decision, supra note 70, at *26 (emphasis added). For an example of
FERC's efforts to deal with market power, see AEP Power Marketing, Inc., 97 FERC 61,219
(2001) (adopting "Supply Margin Assessment" screen, finding market power where seller's
capacity exceeds surplus generating power available at peak demand, without regard to seller's
market share).
100. This description draws on Joskow, supra note 2, at 116-17.
101. Seeid.at116.
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inflows and outflows of energy, which requires the network operator to
attend to congestion constraints and generator operation throughout the
system.
A failure of a major generator can disrupt operations
throughout the system.
The characteristics of electricity networks make them far different to
manage than, for example, telecommunications networks or even airline
networks. The need for continuous coordination among producers and
distributors inevitably affects the complexity of deregulation in ways
that are not the case for other industries that have been deregulated.
Vertical integration had formerly supplied some of that coordination
(although not all, as the need for pre-deregulation power pools
indicates), but the divestiture of generation from transmission networks
made the need for coordination more acute and made inevitable a more
regulatory approach than has been necessary in other industries.
Two other aspects of electric power markets have affected the
progress of deregulation. A major purpose of market-set pricing is to
give clear and accurate signals to investors and consumers so that they
can alter their behavior in ways that are efficient. At this time,
however, structural factors affect the ability of both producers and
consumers to respond to high prices. On the supply side, New York
faces a number of transmission constraints (for example, the Central
East interface between Western and Eastern New York and the
transmission constraint between New York and New England) which
affect the ability to import electricity into markets at times of high price
and high demand. 10 2 A longer-term solution would be entry through the
construction of either new production or transmission capacity, but this
is a slow and difficult process, if only because of substantial
environmental and siting issues. 10 3 Until such entry occurs, however,
electricity markets in New York will be subject to price spikes at
periods of high demand. This, in turn, fuels the willingness to maintain
price caps which, in turn, blunts the incentives of investors to invest in
new capacity as investors become more uncertain about regulatory
willingness to intervene when prices rise.
On the demand side, consumer ability to respond to high prices at
periods of high demand is adversely affected by the lack of enhanced

102. See ADVISOR REPORT, supra note 79, at 6, 52-53; INTERIM PRICING REPORT, supra note
42, at 25 (Central East interface).
103. See ADVISOR REPORT, supra note 79, at i (generation and siting process "have resulted
in very few new generators entering the market over [the] past 5 years"); Kirk Johnson, Promise
and Peril in New York Power Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2000, at BI (discussing potential new
entry in New York City).
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metering. Enhanced metering provides for hourly or other interval
recordings of usage, along with other functions such as the monitoring
of power quality, outage duration, and real time pricing.'
New York
utilities provide enhanced metering to only approximately 3000 of the
state's largest customers. Although the PSC has also required utilities
to provide enhanced metering upon request, few, if any, customers have
chosen to own their own meters.1 5 The inability of consumers to know
exactly when prices are high, of course, blunts the ability of consumers
to shift usage off peak and thereby lower electricity prices or diminish
the need for additional generation or transmission capacity.
D. Wholesale Auction Market Design
The NYISO runs a market exchange that enables buyers and sellers
to meet to establish prices. It is designed as a central wholesale auction
market in which all generators are paid at the highest price bid, rather
than being paid at the price that each generator bids. This design is
consistent with encouraging bids that approach variable costs, which
helps baseload generating plants meet their financial costs, but it also
provides incentives for bidders to game the process so that they can
collect revenues that recover fixed costs and, in times of tight supply,
obtain monopoly rents. Producers may bid some of their capacity at a
high price, or withhold some capacity, in the expectation that the high
marginal bid will be taken, paying lower cost generation at the high
market-clearing price.
The need to regulate this market is in part a reflection of the potential
for this type of strategic bidding behavior and the difficulty of
distinguishing between strategic bids and bids that reflect operating
criteria. The willingness of traders to engage in strategic behavior,
however, is not solely a reflection of the specific market design chosen
by the NYISO. All exchange markets need some regulation to function
efficiently and fairly, the New York Stock Exchange being a good
example. This type of regulation may be complex and will likely vary
over time. Deregulation of electricity markets thus means that financial
regulation may replace price regulation (particularly as complex
financial instruments are developed and traded). It does not mean the
end of regulation.

104. See In re Competitive Opportunities Regarding Electric Service, 194 Pub. Util. Rep.
(PUR) 4th 129, 1999 NY PUC LEXIS 280, at *20 n.I (N.Y. PSC 1999) (Order Providing for
Competitive Metering).
105. See id. at *22.
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IV. CONCLUSION

New York's effort to deregulate electricity markets has been
underway since the early 1990s. The New York Public Service
Commission has directed the effort, with no deregulatory state
legislation, using a process that has attempted to forge a consensus
among producer and consumer interests. The Commission's goal of
quick implementation has not been achieved, however. Designing and
operationalizing the wholesale market, through the establishment of the
New York Independent System Operator, has proven to be more
complex than expected and price spikes and capacity constraints have
forced all parties to accept some degree of continued price regulation
and monitoring. Retail market competition has proven even more
elusive and competing energy supply companies have not yet provided
substantial choice for most New York consumers. In bottom-line terms
of the price of electricity, the Commission's goal of lowering electric
prices, both absolutely and in relation to other states, has not been met.
A number of factors predictably have shaped what has turned out to
be "regulated deregulation" rather than full marketplace competition.
Deregulation of electricity has been kept in the hands of regulatory
institutions that have historically been responsible for insuring that rates
are reasonable and that production is reliable. These institutions have
understandably used the concept of market power to police results
rather than being satisfied with market structures and institutions that
might, at some point, correct to achieve appropriate results. Entry
barriers into production and generation, and lack of demand-side
metering, have made markets slow to self-correct, and the industrial
facts of electric power production and distribution dictate more
continuing centralized coordination than in other industries that have
been deregulated. The adoption of a centralized wholesale auction
exchange market has necessitated the adoption of complex rules to deal
with strategic bidding and to insure that the market operates fairly and
efficiently.
Given these predictable factors, reflection indicates that the PSC was
overly optimistic in the goals it set for deregulation's pace and
achievements. It cannot be said, however, that the PSC was wrong in
embarking on the effort. The critical challenge will be to resist efforts
to move away from marketplace incentives and back towards more
regulatory control. What is necessary is a continuing evolution in the
PSC from regulatory urgency to "supervisor of competitive markets."
This means less concentration on price reductions, per se, and more
concentration on securing market-set prices, whether "high" or "low."
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Investors should be able to understand that regulators at some point will
not permit the earning of excessive profits, but regulators must remain
aware of the fact that the necessary investment in generation and
transmission will occur only if marketplace incentives are provided to
producers and to consumers.

